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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT's ACCESS TO STATE-COMPELLED
TESTIMONY: APPLICATION OF THE TRANSACTIONAL
IMmuNiTY RULE
United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971)
The president of a bank was subpoenaed before a federal grand
jury investigating irregularities in its operation. Invoking his privilege
against self-incrimination he refused to testify. Immediately after his
appearance before the federal grand jury, he was subpoenaed to appear
before the state grand jury where he again invoked his privilege. The
state, under authority of the immunity provision of the North Dakota
Corrupt Practices Act,' compelled him to testify. The United States
Attorney then requested and received a copy of the testimony. Both
state and federal indictments were returned. After the state court
granted McDaniel's motion to suppress the state indictment on the
ground that the statute immunized him from prosecution, he moved
to suppress the federal indictment on the ground that his privilege
against self-incrimination required that the federal government be pro-
hibited from prosecuting. His motion was overruled.2  McDaniel was
convicted on the federal charges of embezzlement and misappropria-
tion. Held: the federal government's access to McDaniel's compelled
testimony, given under a state grant of immunity, gave McDaniel ab-
solute immunity from both federal and state prosecution for any crime
relating to the subject matter of the testimony.3
The conflict between the need for gathering information in areas of
public concern and the citizens' privilege against self-incrimination, 4
required the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of statutes
which grant immunity to witnesses in order to compel testimony.5 The
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-10 (Repl. vol. 1971).
2. United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. Id. at' 841. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine
if the subject matter of the compelled testimony related to the federal charges.
4. See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Tread-
ing the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1568-70 (1963).
5. See Note, Counselman, Malloy, Murphy and the States' Power to Grant Im-
munity, 20 RuTGERs L. Rnv. 336 (1966).
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Supreme Court fashioned two rules in an attempt to resolve this
conflict.,
If a witness is compelled to testify -under a federal immunity statute
invoked by a federal investigatory agency, the federal government is
precluded from prosecuting the witness for any crime relating to the
subject matter of the compelled testimony.7 This rule, known as the
transactional immunity rule, operates as a complete bar to prosecution
of the witness and can be enforced against the government in the
form of a motion to suppress the indictment.8
If a witness is compelled to testify under a state immunity statute
invoked by a state investigating agency, the federal government is only
precluded from using the compelled testimony or its fruits in a future
prosecution against the witness.9 This rule, known as the "use rule","0
is enforced against the government in the form of a motion to sup-
press evidence.11
6. These rules are a result of two decisions, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892), and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52
(1964). In Counselman, a federal immunity statute was invoked by a federal grand
jury, and the threat of prosecution was from the federal government. In Murphy,
a state immunity statute was invoked by a state investigating agency, and the threat of
prosecution was from the federal government. Under United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931), the fifth amendment simply did not apply to state immunity
.tatutes. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), made the fifth amendment applicable
to the states, and the Murphy decision followed in the same term. See Note,
Counselman, Malloy, Murphy and the States' Power to Grant Immunity, 20 RUTLGERS
L. REV. 336 (1966).
There is some authority, Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954, 957 (9th Cir.
1971); Comment, 33 FORDEAM L. Rnv. 77, 80 (1964); Comment, 10 N.Y.L.F. 627
(1964), which holds that Murphy abrogates Counselman, therefore leaving only one
rule. The court in the present case relies on Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), decided after Murphy as supporting the continued viability
of Counselnan, leaving both rules intact. United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832, 836
(8th Cir. 1971).
7. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). This rule under authority of
the supremacy clause, was used to bar prosecution by state authorities when federal
immunity was given. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1953).
8. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 145 (1949); Edwards v. United States,
312 U.S. 473 (1941).
9. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
10. Violation of the use rule is determined by a test put forth by Justice Goldberg
in Murphy, "Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified under a state grant of
immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the
burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an
independent, legitimate source for their evidence." Id. at 79 n.18.
11. United States v. Keilly, 445 F.2d 1285, 1287 (2d Cir. 1971); United States
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/9
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The need for two rules in immunity statutes is brought out in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor.'2  Applying the "use rule" to state immunity
statutes diminishes the restrictive effect that these statutes might have
on federal investigations. Often both governments are investigating
areas which involve possible violations of both state and federal law.
If the states were allowed to give transactional immunity to a witness,
federal prosecution of the witness would be precluded even though
the federal investigation is proceeding independently of the state in-
vestigation. Within the federal system, state and federal authorities often
operate at cross purposes, and the transactional immunity rule may be
used by the state to obstruct the federal prosecution.' 3 For example,
. . [Ain obstreperous South state legislature could 'investigate'
election activities within the state to gain the testimony of officials who
had interfered with the right to vote in violation of the Civil Rights
Acts.""
Because in the principal case the compelled testimony was given to
a state investigating agency under a state grant of immunity and the
federal government is attempting to prosecute, the "use rule" appears
to be controlling.:5 Nevertheless, the transactional immunity rule ap-
plied, because the federal government's access to the compelled testi-
mony constitutes prima facie use of the testimony. The act of viewing
the compelled testimony violated the basic principle of the self-incrim-
v. Wolfson, 294 F. Supp. 267, 273 (D. Del. 1968) (dictum); United States v. American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 278 F. Supp. 608, 613 (W.D. Pa. 1967)
(dictum), aff'd 433 F.2d 174 (1970). The Murphy independent source test is also
cited in decisions determining the admissibility of seized evidence. James v. United
States, 418 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472
(7th Cir. 1968). In United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966), the Supreme Court
held that even if tainted evidence were admitted to the grand jury, that fact alone
would not constitute a basis for baring prosecution. The defendant would only be
allowed to suppress the evidence and its fruits at trial. See also Note, Unconstitu-
tionally Obtained Evidence Before the Grand Jury as a Basis for Dismissing the In-
dictment, 27 MD. L. Rav. 168 (1967).
A pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence might be in order under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. For the possibilities and problems of this course of
action, see Note, The Pre-Indictment Suppression of Illegally Obtained Confessions,
1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 73.
12. 378 U.S. 52, 92 (1964) (concurring opinion).
13. Note, Self-Incrimination and the States: Restriking the Balance, 73 YALE L.I.
1491, 1496 (1964).
14. Id.
15. United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1971).
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ination protection, which is "to leave the witness in substantially the
same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the ab-
sence of a state grant of immunity."' 6  This "prima facie use" put the
federal government in the same position as if it were the investigating
agency compelling the testimony, and this called for application of the
transactional immunity rule. 7 Judge Gibson clearly limits the "prima
facie use" rule to situations in which access is involved, allowing the
exclusionary rule of evidence to apply in other cases in which the in-
vestigating sovereign is the state government and the prosecuting
sovereign is the federal government.' 8
This approach is directly aimed at access. If access is not proved
in the motion to suppress the indictment, the defense is limited to
challenging the state's evidence through a motion to suppress, but if
access is proved, the indictment is suppressed, and prosecution barred.
One reason for this approach is the inherent difficulty of proving or
disproving a link between the prosecutor's access to the testimony and
the evidence produced at trial. 9 Judge Gibson sees the "prima facie
use" theory as an effective method of deterring prosecutor misconduct
without reaching the difficult problems involved in the independent
source test of the "use rule."
While covering the misconduct involved in this case, it may be
over-inclusive in its effect. The revelation of compelled testimony
from the state prosecutor to the federal prosecutor in a casual conver-
sation constitutes access to that testimony, and strict adherence to the
prima facie use theory would bar prosecution even though the federal
prosecutor had a case built on evidence totally independent of the
testimony revealed to him.
It is submitted that the prosecutor's misconduct in the principal
case could have led to a dismissal of the indictment without application
of the transactional immunity rule, and any problems of overinclusion
could have been avoided. By combining the defendant's right to due
process with Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, grounds for dismissal of the indictment can be found. In
16. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
17. United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1971).
18. Id. at 840.
19. See Comment, 33 FonI-IAM L. REv. 77, 80 (1964). For a discussion of the
derivative evidence rule generally, see also George, The Faults of Miranda: Scope of
the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. CoLo. L. Rpv. 478 (1967).
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Mooney v. Holohan,20 a case involving the prosecutor's use of perjured
testimony, the Supreme Court established that prosecutor misconduct
can be a violation of the defendant's right to due process when the
conduct would result in an unfair trial for the accused.21  This estab-
lishes a constitutional violation for prosecutor misconduct and, Rule
12(b) (1) allows that "any defense or objection which is capable of
determination without trial of the general issue" may be raised in a pre-
trial motion.22 The trial court may then determine if the miscon-
duct is so prejudicial that a fair trial would be impossible, and dismiss
the indictment.23 Another ground can be found in the court's super-
visory power,24 although there is little case law specifically using this
vehicle for dismissal of the indictment on the ground of prosecutor
misconduct.
By attacking the prosecutor's misconduct in this fashion, the de-
fendant's freedom from an improper indictment is preserved; and the
government is allowed to maintain a prosecution when there is no
misconduct and the prosecution is based on evidence which passes the
independent source test.
20. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
21. See United States v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 433
F.2d 174, 191 (3d Cir. 1970) (dictum); United States v. Young, 426 F.2d 93 (6th
Cir. 1970) (dictum); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
22. FED. R. CRim. P. 12(b) (1).
23. Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24. "Another view of the supervisory power is that it permits the judiciary to de-
cline to entertain a prosecution by reason of official conduct, particularly in relation to
the gathering of evidence, that is wrongful from a judicial perspective though not viola-
tive of constitutional or statutory provisions." Hill, Tle Bill of Rights and the Super-
visory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 199 (1969).
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